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SPEECH
OF THE

Hon. JAMES A. BAYARD,

In the Senate of the U. States,
Upon his motion made on the 16th of June, to postpone
the further consideration of the bill declaring li ar
against Great Britain, to the 31st of October.

*
MR. BAYARD said that he was entirely sensible of the
inutility in general of entering upon the discussion of a
subject which had been a long time under consideration, and
upon which it might be supposed that the opinions of members
were formed and settled ; but on an occasion so momentous
as the present, he should not feel himself justified in submitting
even a motion of postponement, without offering his reasons
in support of it—nor could he think that in giving a silent
vote, that he had discharged the duty of his station. Gentle
men would remark, that he had confined his motion to time,
in order that members might not be compromitted in support
ing it, who might think the war itself just and necessary.
The motion did not oppose or deny the sufficiency of the
causes, or the policy of the war. It went only to affirm what
he trusted the course of his observations would render very
evident, that this was not a time at which war ought to be
declared.
He indulged a confidence, that upon so great an occasion
the Senate would not be impelled to act by any little passions,
nor by any considerations which did not arise out of an ex
tended and distinct view of the interests of the country. It is
not enough that we have cause of war, we must see that we
are prepared, and in a condition to make war. You do not go
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to war for the benefit of your enemy, but your own advantage—
not to give proofs of vain and heedless courage, but to assert
your rights and redress your wrongs. If you commence hos
tilities, before you are prepared to strike a blow, and while
your cities, your territory, and your property on the ocean,
are exposed to the mercy of a government possessing vast re
sources of war, what can you expect but to add new distresses,
defeat, and disgrace, to the wrongs of which you complain. It
is a strange motive for war—a wish to gratify the rapacity, to
swell the triumphs, and to increase the insolence of the enemy.
Mr. B. said that neither the government nor the people had
expected, or were prepared for war. Even at this moment the
general opinion abroad was, that there would be no war—the
mercantile and trading world had continued to act upon that
opinion—nor could people be persuaded, that an unarmed nation
was about to attack a nation armed cap a pie. No man had
laid out his account for this war, and every one would be taken
by surprize, and unprepared for its shock. You have at this
moment an immense property abroad, a great portion of it in
England, and part floating on the ocean, and hastening to your
ports. The postponement proposed might save a great portion
of this property, and bring home the seamen now absent from
the country. Gentlemen would remember the number of ships
which left our ports upon the eve of the embargo—these vessels
had not time to perform their voyages, and the greater part of
them were still abroad. He knew that some members had no
commiseration for the merchant who had dared to escape the
embargo, and who had disregarded the salutary precautions,
designed, as it was said, for his security. But he did not
think it surprising nor culpable, that those whose property
consisted in ships, should be averse to seeing them rotting at
the wharves, and even disposed to incur risks to find employ
ment for them abroad.
Even, however, if it should be thought that the merchants
had acted with indiscretion and folly, it is the part of a parental
government, such as this ought always to be, not to punish the
citizens for their misfortunes, but to guard them against the
effects of their errors. Beside, a loss of individual property
was a loss to the state, as the publick strength was derived
from individual resources.
He stated that the question of war had been doubtful till the
present moment. He did not believe that the President him
self expected war at the opening of the session, nor for a long
time after. A menacing language was held out, but the hopes
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of an accommodation were far from being abandoned. Much
was expected from the prince regent’s accession to his full
powers. A change of ministry was not doubted ; and it was
thought, that in the change of men, there would have been
found such a change of principles and measures, that the diff
erences between the two governments might be compromised
and settled. This expectation was protracted, till it became
plainly evident that the prince did not intend to change his
father’s ministers, nor to depart from their principles or meas
ures. When this discovery was made, the administration had
proceeded too far to recede.
Desperate as the course was which now alone remained to
be pursued, they supposed they were obliged to advance, or be
come the object of reproach and scorn both to friends and foes.
This necessity they had brought upon themselves, but it was
too late to consider whether the condition might have been
avoided ; they were pledged in the state of events to attempt
to extort from Britain by force the concession of those points
which their arguments had failed in persuading her to yield.
He had no doubt, but that some months past, the cabinet had.
seriously determined upon resorting to hostilities. But the
concurrence of congress was to be obtained; and whether a
majority of both houses could be brought to take the daring
and hazardous step, no man in or out of the government, with
out the gift of prophecy, could have predicted.
The publick mind had been so repeatedly distracted
and deceived by boisterous speeches and bold but ephemeral
resolutions, that it had sunk into a state of apathy, and was no
longer excited even by the sound of war echoed in the minis
terial paper from the proceedings of government.
When the bill before us was first bro’t up from the other house,
it was the opinion of very few that it would obtain the support
of a majority of this body ; and even now, it was likely to pass,
not because it was approved by a majority, but of the differ
ences of opinion which existed among gentlemen as to other
courses which had been proposed.
If, with the light and information possessed in this body as
to the views and designs of the cabinet and of congress, it has
been doubtful among ourselves whether the government would
resort to war, how was it to be known by our merchants or
any other class of society unacquainted with the intentions and
secret proceedings of those exercising the powers of the gov
ernment, that the nation would be wantonly plunged into a
sudden war ?
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He had heard it said that the embargo was sufficient notice
of the design of the government to resort to hostilities upon
its expiration ; and that people must be infatuated, who, after
such warning, were not apprized of the approaching crisis.
But it is too recently and deeply in our recollection to be for
gotten, that this is not the first embargo we have experienced,
and which, though of longer duration, we saw pass away with
out being followed by war.
The language held here as to people out of doors who have
doubted of the war, is retorted by the publick voice with equal
confidence and on better grounds. • They rely upon your in
tegrity and wisdom, and say that congress cannot be so infat
uated, destitute as they are of the means of aggression or de
fence, to draw upon themselves a war with one of the most
powerful and formidable nations on the globe. If a war with
Britain be tho’t unavoidable, yet, as she leaves to us the time
of commencing it, surely we ought to select that time, when
the first shock shall be least disastrous, and can best be resisted.
Why should we hurry into a war from which nothing but ca
lamity can be expected ? There is no danger that the redress
of our wrongs or the assertion of our rights will be barred by
the limitation of time. No time has existed for years past
when we had less cause to complain of the conduct of G. Brit
ain. Her vessels of war had all been withdrawn from our
coast, as he presumed, in order to avoid collisions and hostility.
If the war be suspended till November, the government and
the people will both be better prepared to sustain it. He was
not a friend to the restrictive system, but with a choice only
of evils, he should prefer the embargo to war. Postpone the
war and we will submit to the embargo till November.—This
will furnish time for the return of your ships and seamen ; and
if at the same time you will abandon the non-importation act,
you will replenish your treasury with at least twelve millions
of dollars, and restore to your citizens sixty millions now abroad and in danger of being lost. It appeared to him that
the course which had been pursued was the most preposterous
imaginable. For eighteen months past we had been sending
our property out of the country, and not suffering it to return ;
and while contemplating a war with G. B. we saw our effects
to an immense amount accumulating in that kingdom, liable
any moment to fall a prey to the government, and to be em
ployed in support of the war against us. He asked, why
rush with this precipitancy into the war ? Are you provided
with means to annoy the enemy or to defend yourselves ? Have
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you an army or navy which can make any impression ? Are
your exposed towns fortified and garrisoned ? Was any nation
ever less prepared for war ? It would require the whole mili
tary force you possess to constitute an adequate defence for
New Orleans, New York and Newport. It is very well known
that the general who will command at New Orleans, has declar
ed to the government, that he will not be answerable for the
security of the place with a less force than ten thousand men,
which is equal to all the effective troops yet raised. It would be
natural to suppose that no government would declare war till it
was prepared to attack its enemy. In peace we require no de
fence, and shall we declare war in order only to defend ourselves ?
But what blow are you prepared to strike ? Were you able in the
summer to recruit your army of twenty-five thousand men,
could it be employed in any service in the course of this year ?
A soldier is not made in a day. The authority of a foreign
officer now in this country of the highest military reputation, he
had heard frequently cited, that it required at least fourteen
months to form a soldier of a recruit. This remark applied to
France, where the officers have generally received a military
education, and where there are so many models to imitate and
so many instructors to teach. But here the officer is to form
as well as the soldier.—The officer has to learn his lesson first
before he can prescribe the task of the soldier. You may pos
sibly have a herd of men, but you can have no army to lead in
to service this season—And if this herd be led against disci
plined troops you can expect nothing but defeat and disgrace.
But you have not got, nor can you get the men during the
present year. These are not the days of Cadmus. It will re
quire great patience and industry, and a considerable length of
time, to collect twenty five thousand men. Have you the least
prospect, if you declare war, of attacking Canada this season ?
It is impossible that you can do it with effect.—You will be
sufficiently occupied in defending your frontiers against the
savages.
It is not on land then that you expect immediately to assail your
enemy. Is it on the ocean that the impression is to be made ?
You have twenty vessels of war—Britain has upwards of a
thousand.—What will avail the activity or gallantry of your
officers and seamen against such disparity of force. Your little
navy must fall immediately or be driven from the ocean. Some
gentlemen indulge great expectations from privateers ; but has
Great Britain any unarmed or unprotected trade which they
can attack ? Privateers have no other object than plunder and
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booty. They avoid armed vessels—and defended as is the
British commerce in every part of the world by her great na
val force, it is little to be expected that privateering will be at
tended with much success or encouragement. But while we
are searching for the means of annoying the commerce of Brit
ain, does it become us to overlook at this moment the condi
tion of our own. A valuable part of the trade from beyond
the Cape of Good Hope has not yet arrived. Of the number
less vessels which sailed upon the eve of the embargo few have
returned. Your merchant vessels are without convoy and ut
terly defenceless. Your condition, therefore, is, that with more
commerce exposed, your adversary will possess greater means
of annoyance, and the consequence must be, that we shall lose
infinitely more than we can expect to gain.
Under such circumstances what should hurry us into the
war ? Are gentlemen afraid if they wait till November, that the
world will not last long enough to afford them time to gratify
in war their mighty resentment against Britain ? He believed
as he hoped, that there was no honorable gentlemen on the
floor who would not live long enough to have a complete sur
feit of the war, though it should be postponed for a few months.
He said he was greatly influenced in his motion for postpone
ment by the combined considerations of the present defenceless
condition of the country, and the protection which providence
had given us against a maritime power in the winter season.
During the winter months you will be defended by the ele
ments.—Postpone the war till November, and we shall not
have to dread an enemy on our coast till April. In the mean
time go on with your recruiting, fill up, discipline, and train
your army. Take the stations if you please which will enable
you to open an early campaign. Your trade will all have time
to return, before hostilities commence, and having all your ships
and seamen at home, you may be prepared to put forth all
your strength upon the ocean on the opening of the ensuing
spring. Shall we by an untimely precipitancy, yielding to a
fretful impatience of delay, throw our wealth into the hands of
the enemy, and feed that very rapacity which it is our object
to subdue or to punish.
We can lose nothing by delay; much will be certainly saved;
and at a moment pregnant with great events, it was most evi
dently our true policy to temporize.—You give up no right, yield
no pretension, and profit by every day in rendering the condi
tion of the country more secure and its attitude more formida
ble. The just appreciation of time is among the highest points
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of political sagacity. To know what step the times will war
rant, and to take the step at the proper time, is generally a mat
ter of more important and difficult consideration than the na
ture of a proposed measure. Without enquiring whether war
was the right course for the nation to take under existing cir
cumstances, he did most confidently assert that this was not
the time when war ought to be commenced.
Mr. B. said it belonged to the motion he had submitted to
bring under review the alleged causes of war, and to enquire
into the probability of our attaining the objects for which we
were to embark in the war. If we are to come out of the war as
we enter into it, after having wasted the blood and treasure of
the nation, and loaded the country with debt and taxes, it would
certainly be more rational to submit at once to the wrongs we
endure. If we expect to extort any concession from Britain,
we must be prepared for a long, obstinate and bloody conflict.
Britain at this moment certainly does not court the quarrel.
She has reduced the catalogue of our complaints ; and though
not disposed to surrender her pretensions, she has evidently
made advances towards conciliation. The recent orders in
council were designed to be so considered, and she has removed
a great source of umbrage in withdrawing her armed ships from
our coasts. She had offered satisfaction for the affair of the
Chesapeake, which our government had accepted—which must
therefore be taken to be honorable and sufficient, and the offence
which had been given completely expiated.
We are no longer at variance in relation to the colonial trade.
France no longer has colonies, and we have no occasion to
contend at present for an empty right which could not be exer
cised if yielded.
The question, therefore, as to the right of a neutral to be the
carrier of the produce of the colony of a belligerent, having
been reduced by the course of the war to a mere question of
theory, it no longer entered into the disputes of the two gov
ernments.
The question as to the impressment of our seamen did not
present insuperable difficulties. Britain never contended for a
right to impress American seamen. The right she claims is
to take her own subjects found in our merchant service. She
exercises the right in relation to her own private vessels. This
right she never will, nor can, give up.—If our merchant flag
were a secure protection to British seamen who sailed under
it, the British navy must be unmanned by desertion ; while
our merchants can and do pay a dollar for every shilling a
sailor can earn in the naval service of his country.
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Can it be expected that a nation which depends for its ex
istence upon its naval strength, would yield a principle threatning the destruction of its maritime power ? No war, of any
duration, or however disastrous, will ever extort this conces
sion—she may as well fall with arms in her hands, as to seal
quietly the bond of her ruin.
He did not know that our government had ever required the
unqualified abandonment of the right to impress. Our com
plaints were chiefly of the abuses committed in the exercises
of the right. It was a practice frequently attended with violence,
insult, and gross injustice. Americans were often from de
sign or mistake seized as British subjects, and we have abun
dant evidence of the fact, that many of our native seamen have
been forced into British service.—He had always understood,
however, that such acts were not justified by the British gov
ernment. The government have never claimed the right of
holding an American seaman against his will.—The preten
sions of the two governments upon this subject, admitted of
adjustment. The chief embarrassment arose from the difficulty
of distinguishing the sailors of the two countries. But he had
no doubt that this, and all other difficulties on the subject,
might be vanquished without having recourse to war.
The dispute, as to paper blockades, was for the present,
merged in the orders in council. Those orders were now to
be considered as comprehending the whole cause of war.
This subject deserves to be viewed in every light. The or
ders in council were not at this time, in truth, supported upon
their original ground. The ex-minister Mr. Canning, had publickly and candidly confessed the fact. They were adopted as
measures of retaliation, though they never deserved that char
acter. He had always considered the Berlin and Milan de
crees used as a mere pretext. Those decrees were vain and
empty denunciations in relation to England. The plain design
of the British government was to deprive France of the bene
fits of external commerce, unless the profits of it were divided
with herself.—This was fully proved by the licence trade. Bri
tain carries on the very trade she denies to neutrals, and hav
ing engrossed the whole to herself, she excludes neutrals from
participation. No man was more disposed than himself to re
probate the wrong and injustice of the British government up
on this subject. They resort to the French decrees to justify
themselves, and though he considered them as no justification,
yet, our government in their conduct had admitted that the
decrees placed us upon the same footing as to France as the
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orders did as to England, and required equal measures to both
nations.
Our government have been pleased to say what he did not
think at this time any man in the nation believed besides them
selves. They have been pleased to say the decrees are re
pealed.
This is a fact, and asserted without any proof. The decrees
could only be repealed by the same power and in the same
manner in which they were enacted. They proceeded from
the sovereign power of France and became the laws of the em
pire. The same power in the solemn form of a law could
alone revoke them. We possess the decrees in all the forms
of law, but have we ever seen, has the government any reason
to believe that any decree in the form of a law has been passed
to repeal them ?----- The promise of a sovereign to repeal a
law does not annul it, nor would a reference of his minister to
its being repealed have that effect. Every sovereign power
prescribes to itself a form in which its sovereign will shall be
known, when it is to constitute a law of the land.
The decrees teach us what this form is in France, and we
have no ground to believe that the decrees are repealed, till we
see an act of the sovereign in the same form in which they are
found.—Such is the course among ourselves. A law is repeal
ed by a law passed in the same form. It is the practice of
every nation in Europe, and of every civilized nation on the
earth. But even the promise to repeal was only conditional,
and it has never been announced to us that the emperor con
sidered the condition complied with on our part by prohib
iting the importation of British produce and manufactures.
In fact, daily accounts are received of seizures made on the
principles of those decrees : and, to affirm that the decrees are
repealed, was only to add perfidy to the atrocity of the conduct
of the French, who do not hesitate to plunder, burn and de
stroy our property on the high seas, even after abandoning the
pretence with which at first they were respectful enough to at
tempt to cover their violence.
Nothing could be more evident than the policy of the French
emperor, nor any thing more mortifying than the success which
has attended his juggling.—He has contrived to satisfy our
government that he has repealed his decrees, while to the eyes
of the rest of the world they appear to be in force. By these
means he has opened our ports to the publick and private ships
of France, and shut them against those of Great Britain. He
denies the evidence of the repeal of his decrees, which he well
knows, if furnished to us, would immediately remove the or2
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ders in council, and facilitate the settlement of our differences
with England. Britain has declared, that the moment evi
dence is produced of the repeal of the decrees, the orders in
council shall ipso facto be annulled. The emperor, instead of
furnishing this evidence, is giving daily proofs, to our sorrow
and loss, that the decrees are in force and operation.
I am among the last men in the Senate, said Mr. B. who
would justify or defend the orders in council. They violate
the plainest rights of the nation. The ground of retaliation
Was never more than a pretext, and their plain object is to de
prive France of neutral trade. It never was contended, nor
does Britain now contend, that she would be justified by the
laws or usages of nations to interdict our commerce with her
enemy. She covers her injustice with the cloak of retaliation,
and insists that she has a right to retort upon her enemy the
evils of his own policy. This is a doctrine to which I am not
disposed to agree. It is destruction to neutrals—-It makes them
the prey of the belligerents. It is a doctrine which we must
resist, but the time and manner of resistance ought to be de
termined by a view only to our own interests. Because we
are injured we certainly are not bound to make war, before
it is for our own benefit. There is one effect of this war which
gentlemen ought to take into view, and which, to him, was a
source of grief and humiliation. In making war upon Eng
land, we bring the force of the nation in aid of France. We
are about to assist a government from whom we have suffered
for years past the most humilitating insults and the most atro
cious wrongs. We are about to make a common cause with
a man who hates us for our language, and despises us for our
government, and who would to-morrow if he had the means,
without seeking a pretence, add us to the list of his conquered
provinces. This connexion should not be hastily formed. To
other nations it has been the forerunner of their subjugation
and ruin. Let us take time to consider the consequences of a
step upon which the destiny of the nation depends. We may
profit by delay, but can gain nothing by precipitancy. The
war will not hastily remove the Orders in Council. It is the
principle of the orders, rather than their effect of which we
complain. The trade to France, which they interdict, is of
little consequence to the country. Its annual amount is
less than three millions of dollars, and you find it oner
ated with duties so excessive, and restricted to such ar
ticles of exchange, that even if enjoyed in safety, it would be
productive of little profit to individuals or to the nation. If,
however, you declare war at this time, you lose the trade to
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G. Britain and her dependencies, equal to thirty-five millions
a year, without gaining the paltry trade with France. The
laws of war will operate still more extensively than the Or
ders in Council; and though no doubt we shall gratify the
Emperor of France, we shall enjoy little commerce with his
dominions. As it regards therefore, our interest, it is found
in protracting the present state of affairs. Some gentlemen
consider that the honour of the nation called for immediate
hostilities. It is admitted that a country is bound to defend
its honour, nor can its interest be well separated from its hon
our. But what honour can you acquire by going to war in
your present unprepared and feeble state ? In respect to na
tions, their glory and their success are nearly allied. A van
quished nation gains no honour, however just its cause may
be. You have certainly no force prepared to enter Canada.
Your army is still to be formed. It is to be found on paper,
but not in the field. With militia no invasion of a foreign ter
ritory can be contemplated. They are not bound to pass your
frontiers, and desirous they cannot be to shed their blood, in
order to add by conquest to the unwieldy territories of the United States. Is it on the ocean that we are to look for lau
rels, with twenty ships opposed to a thousand ? The most des
perate courage cannot command success against such fearful
odds. The loss of our navy and of our commerce must be the
consequences of the war upon the ocean—and is this the hon
our gentlemen are so impatient to enjoy ?
There was reason to believe that Britain would feel the war
only through its restrictive effects. At this moment especially,
she stood in need of our produce as well as our market. The
embargo and non importation, which denied her both, were un
doubtedly felt. The objection to them was their re-action up
on ourselves. The great question was, whether we did not in
flict upon ourselves a deeper wound than upon our adversary. If
such were the case, it was a strange mode of retaliating. But
if this be the edge of the war, which is to wound the enemy—
had we not better retain our present condition ? The war is
not necessary to execute the restrictive system ; and if restric
tion be the chief effect of war, had we not better bear with the
evils of this system, than involve ourselves at the same time in
the calamities of war ?
Mr. B. said that his motion was recommended by the strong
consideration, that by postponing the declaration of war, we
could lose nothing, and certainly would gain a great deal. Hos
tilities would be suspended during the present year. In the
mean time, you will be employed in raising and disciplining
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your army, and in providing the munitions of war—your ves
sels, property and seamen may be brought home, and you have
the chance of propitious events which may interpose.
England at this moment is in a convulsed and distracted state.
Tumults, little short of insurrection, have happened in differ
ent parts of the kingdom. The present ministry hold their
places by a very precarious tenure. The real disposition, and
intentions of the Prince Regent are not distinctly and certainly
known. The Prince may be forced to yield to the popular
sentiment. We had lately seen the corporation of London
come forward with an address against the Orders in Council.
This body had always had great weight in the kingdom, espe
cially in giving an impulse and direction to popular opinion.
Let us wait the operation of these domestic causes. A little
patience, and triumph may be secured to us, by the People of
England themselves without bloodshed. The minister had al
ready receded one step. He had suffered the orders to go to
a Committee. It would be difficult, against the strong current
of sentiment which prevailed, for him to recover his former
ground.
At the same time, if we cast our eyes on the continent of
Europe, we see every thing in commotion. Armies of unpar
alleled numbers taking the field. A crisis of vast magnitude
existed, which might terminate in the subjection of all Europe
to the Power of Bonaparte. If, however, the Emperor of Rus
sia should avoid the shock, and tamely yield to the continen
tal system of his adversary, the effect of this occlusion of the
ports of all Europe to the British trade, could not fail to be
sensibly felt by that power, and to create new inducements upon
her part, to cultivate friendship and peace with the United
States.
At the same time, gentlemen would call to mind the unset
tled state of affairs between this country and France. The
principle of impartial and equal conduct as to the belligerents
was avowed by all, and he had as yet met with no one who
hesitated to declare, that if France refused redress for the
wrongs she had done us, that the same course ought to be taken
in relation to her as to England. It was alleged that negociation was still pending between the United States and France,
and at present we were bound to abstain from acts of hostility
as to her. This doubtful state of affairs as to that power was a
strong reason for delay. A few months will necessarily realize
or disappoint the expectations which are entertained. It could
not be the intention of Gentlemen to propitiate the Emperor,
and to secure a treaty by means of a war with England. This
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would be purchasing his friendship at the expense of our honour,
as well as of our blood and treasure. Before we break with
England, we ought to know upon what terms we stand with
France. If France will concede nothing, in order to induce us
to enter into the war, what are we to expect when she is no
longer asking our aid, but we are standing in need of her assist
ance, to carry on the contest. In vain then will you ask for
redress, and indemnity for seizures and spoliations. Let us
wait and see what she will do before we throw ourselves into
her scale—afterwards, it will be too late.
The Wasp will return before Nov. and what is now doubtful
with some, will then be certain with all. Some Gentlemen
were looking for the return of this vessel each succeeding day.
But for his part, he was two well instructed in arrangements,
by the history of the Hornet, to expect to see the Wasp for
some months after the time announced for her arrival. In Feb
ruary, the Government gave out that the Hornet was daily ex
pected, and with a passage of twenty days she did not arrive
for three months after. She was detained by the very cause
which will detain the Wasp, waiting fora treaty. If she waits
for a treaty, which is to indemnify us for the losses sustained
under the plundering decree of Rambouillet, which some Gen
tlemen flatter themselves with the expectation of being grant
ed by Imperial justice, it is much to be dreaded she will never
revisit the American shores. Do you expect that Bonaparte
will restore the booty which he has seized ? As well might you
expect that the grave would surrender its prey.
If, as was said, indemnity for spoliations was to be the basis
of amicable relations with France, sure he was, that we need
not wait for the intelligence the Wasp might bring. Or, if you
expect a commercial treaty, which is to give activity to your
commerce, by opening the ports of France to your trade, it is
a delusion, which time will dissipate and under which we ought
not to act. He knew the source of this delusion. It grew out
of the letter of Mr. Barlow, our minister in France, to Mr.
Granger the Post-master general. That letter, he understood,
was dated about the 16th of February, with an endorsement of
the 3d of March. Mr. Barlow expressed the expectation of
forming a commercial treaty with the French government, and
the Hornet was detained for the purpose of carrying it. He
believed the Country was most grossly deceived and imposed
upon by this letter of Mr. Barlow. That gentleman never en
tertained the opinion which the letter expressed. He knew
and was entirely satisfied at the time when he wrote the
letter, that a treaty which was to open the ports of France to
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the trade of this country was impracticable. Mr. B. said he
spoke not on the ground of presumption, nor of any slight evidence. He had seen a letter of Mr. Barlow to Mr. Latrobe,
of which he held an extract in his hand, which was dated on
the 29th of February, which in very eloquent terms and on the
strongest grounds expressed an opinion, that no commercial ar
rangement would be entered into by the French government.
He would read the extract to the Senate. Mr. B. here read
the following extract of a letter from Mr. Barlow to Mr. La
trobe, dated on the 29th of February, 1812.
“ The expectations of yourself and my other friends on my
doings here are too high I fear to be realized. It is very dif
ficult to produce a change in a system combined with so many
circumstances of vengeance, and other strong passions arrayed
against an enemy, as is the anti-commercial system of Napo
leon. Argument and eloquence have but little power in the
case. That old fashioned goddess, whom artists represent with
banded eyes and a pair of scales has still less to do. And if
you suppose me with the help of these capable of overturning
a decision which the cries of twenty commercial cities going to
decay, and the united voice of all the wise and honest men of
this nation have not been able to shake nor scarcely to modify,
I can only wish, and that with little hope, that you may not be
disappointed.”
This letter was written after the letter to Mr. Granger which
gave the assurances of a commercial treaty, and only three
days before the Postcript indorsed on the letter which alleged
the detention of the Hornet to be in order to send the treaty to
this country. It did not belong to him to account for the con
tradiction between the letters ; Poets might be entitled to indulgences when even writing prose, which were denied to the
rest of the world, but it was his purpose in reading the extract of
Mr. Barlow’s letter, not only to avail himself of the authority of
the minister but of what he valued more, of the weight of the rea
sons assigned in the letter, for not expecting a commercial ar
rangement with France. He would repeat in the language of
the letter, if the cries of twenty commercial cities going to decay, and the united voice of all the wise and honest men of the
nation had not been able to shake, or scarcely to modify the
anti-commercial system of Napoleon, what was to be expected
from the negociation of an American minister ? For his part,
he expected nothing but false promises and delusive hopes.
Can you expect that Napoleon will relax his anti-commer
cial system in favour of your commerce, when you see him
bringing into the field five hundred thousand men and ready to

hazard the imperial crown, in order to compel Russia to adopt
and enforce the same system ? To indulge the expectation was
to make ourselves the sport of the most visionary hope. The
Wasp would bring us duplicates of the dispatches which had
been received by the Hornet, and protracted hope would at
last sink in despair. He thought, however, that those gentle
men who still kept expectation alive, that, France would do us
justice and grant us commercial favours, under the weight of
doubt, which must depress their hopes, ought to wait for the
ultimate intelligence, which was to determine our relations with
France, and shew us more clearly the course which our inter
est or honour required that we should take in relation to G.
Britain.
Sir, said Mr. B. before I set down, I will call the attention
of the Senate to another ground for postponement, which can
never safely be overlooked nor neglected in a Government like
that of the United States. This war is not to be supported by
the men only who declare it; its weight will fall upon the great
body of the people, and they are to sustain its pressure. Can
you maintain the war without the general support of the peo
ple ?
The publick sentiment is not at present known on the
subject. The people have never yet believed us serious in our
intention of making war against Great Britain. Let us wait
till we can have a full and distinct expression of their opinion.
Are you afraid that opinion is against the war ? and if so, are
you hardy enough to make war ? Do you forget your origin, that
you are creatures of the people’s favor ? That it is their pow
er which you are exercising, and that you have no strength of
your own ? He must be little instructed in the nature or his
tory of our government, who supposes that a war can be long
supported against the will of the people. The constitution
makes the general will, the basis of the Government. That
will upon all occasions must be consulted, and must be obeyed.
You may commence the war against the will of the people, but
how long can you exercise the powers of government against
their will ?
He knew well that some gentlemen calculated
much from the war spirit. That war spirit, was at most but
the ebullition of the passions ; short-lived in its nature as are
all the passions.
Taxes and privations will soon extinguish it, and you will
have to settle your account with a nation in their sober senses.
If unfortunately, the spirit of the war should inflame the party
passions to madness, and the people should be willing to sacri
fice their country to support a party, then indeed might Min
isters calculate upon holding their power.—But can we foresee
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the consequences of thus inflaming the furious passions of a
whole people ? Have you a saving power in the Constitution,
which shall bring us out of the mad struggle, an entire nation ?
Our Constitution was designed for peace and protection, but
not for offensive war. Its great aim was to preserve among
ourselves the principles of civil and political liberty. So cau
tiously in many cases, have the abuses of publick authority been
guarded against, that the salutary exercise of power has been
denied. Against a foreign power, with a united people, it may
not be deficient in energy ; but divided among ourselves, it is
without force. It possesses no saving principle if the North
become arrayed against the South. And if the course of things
should lead to this conflict, we should have left only the recol
lection of having lived under a common government. What
is there to insure us against this dreadful event ? If the north
ern states conceive their interests to be sacrificed, and find their
sufferings disregarded, will they long yield to an authority
which has not power to controul them ? The authority of the
government once successfully resisted, it is afterwards despis
ed, and there is an end of the constitution and of the union.
With any nation at any time, war is a hazardous experiment
with our government. In peace we have experienced its bless
ings. We have seen ourselves under it, one of the most hap
py and flourishing people on the earth. Greatly is it to be dreaded,
that the frail barque will not endure the storm of intestine divis
ion, and of foreign war. Upon a question of doubtful expedience,
you are about rashly to hazard the existence of the union. Can
the Senate be exempt at this moment from the most awful im
pressions ? How great is our trust and our responsibility ! The
destiny of millions depends upon our decision ! Shall we
make it hastily ?
I pray God to relieve us from the infatua
tion of such blind precipitancy, and I call upon you while yet it
is not too late, while yet you are standing on the brink of the
precipice, to pause solemnly, and contemplate the consequen
ces, before you take the final fatal step, which may plunge the
nation into an abyss of inevitable ruin.
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